This study investigates the effects of government R&D programs on firm innovation outputs, which are measured by the number of patents, sales from new products, and exports. Particularly, we examine the effects of Innovation Fund for Small and Medium Technology-based Firms (Innofund), which is one of the largest government R&D programs that support R&D activities of small and medium-sized enterprises in China. Using a panel dataset on Chinese manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2007, we find that Innofund-backed firms generate significantly higher technological and commercialized innovation outputs compared with their nonInnofund-backed counterparts and the same firms before winning the grant. Moreover, the changes in the governance of Innofund in 2005 from a centralized to a decentralized one because of policy amendments have significant effects on the effectiveness of the program. Specifically, the magnified effects of Innofund on technological innovation outputs become significantly stronger after the governance of Innofund becomes more decentralized. Identification problems are addressed by utilizing both propensity score matching and two-stage estimation approaches.
Introduction
Government funding for corporate research and development (R&D) is a major practice in most countries. The major rationale for such government initiative is that firms may underinvest in R&D under a free market because of the externalities generated by these activities (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962) , as well as the information issues associated with these projects (Greenwald et al., 1984; Hall and Lerner, 2009 ).
Hence, government engagement is raised as a mechanism to respond to market failures (Romer, 1986; Aghion and Howitt, 1990) . Underinvestment in R&D has been well reasoned theoretically and is evident empirically. However, determining the extent to which government intervention could stimulate firms to invest more in R&D and consequently improve their economic and technological performance is a challenging empirical question.
Empirical findings on the effects of government R&D programs are inconclusive. Griliches and Regev (1998) and Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) find that government-subsidized firms achieve higher productivity and profitability in Israel and Japan, respectively. Moreover, such firms grow faster (Lerner, 2000) , access other external finances more successfully (Lerner, 2000; Aschhoff, 2009) , invest more in R&D activities (Audretsch et al., 2002; Lach, 2002; Görg and Strobl, 2007; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013) , and generate higher social returns than their counterparts do (Griliches and Regev, 1998; Irwin and Klenow, 1996) . Nevertheless, a considerable number of studies also indicate that public R&D programs have not stimulated firm performance (Klette and Møen, 1999; Brander et al., 2008) or have limited positive effects on corporate R&D spending, except for small firms (Lööf and Hesmati, 2005) or research-oriented projects (Clausen, 2009) . Several studies even find that government R&D subsidies crowd out private R&D inputs (crowding out effect), thereby consequently reducing social welfare and growth (David, et al., 2000; Wallsten, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2013) .
The mixed findings on the effects of government R&D programs have several implications. First, institutions may influence the effects of such R&D programs.
Public R&D finance is introduced as a solution to the underinvestment in R&D activities by profit-driven businesses. Institutions affect the degree of the role of the market in allocating resources and the efficiency of the government (Acemoglu et al., 2005) . As a result, the institutions under which the market interacts with government initiatives are ultimately important to determine the success of the government R&D initiatives. Indeed, empirical studies find that the effects of public R&D subsidies across countries exhibit significant heterogeneity (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000; Cincera et al., 2009 ). Moreover, a few works based on U.S. data demonstrate a crowding-out effect of public R&D programs (e.g., Wallsten, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2013) , whereas most studies based on data from non-U.S. countries find universally positive effects of such programs despite the variation in the degree of complementary influence (e.g., Lach, 2002; Cincera et al., 2009; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013 ).
Second, even under similar institutions, the governance of these public R&D programs may result in variations on the incentives provided to government agencies who allocate the resources. Government agencies play an essential role in allocating resources through public R&D programs. Thus, the governance of these programs will expectedly affect their effectiveness. However, to our knowledge, focus on the governance of government R&D programs and its effects is insufficient. Third, endogeneity issues in empirical examinations resulting from data constraints are also a major challenge in existing studies, which may have also contributed to the conflicting findings (Klette et al., 2000) .
This study attempts to fill some of the abovementioned gaps. We examine the effects of Innovation Fund for Small and Medium Technology-based Firms (Innofund) on the innovation outputs of firms. Innofund is the largest government program that aims to support corporate R&D activities of small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in China. Specifically, we address two major questions. First, we examine whether Innofund enables firms to generate more outputs on both commercialized innovation (measured by sales from new products and exports) and technological innovation (measured by patent counts). Second, we estimate whether the changes in Using a panel dataset on Chinese manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2007, we find that Innofund-backed firms generate significantly higher innovation outputs (both commercial and technological innovation outputs) than their non-Innofund-supported counterparts and themselves before gaining Innofund support. We also observe stronger magnified effects of Innofund on technological innovation outputs (measured by the count of newly granted patents) after 2005 when Innofund governance shifted from a centralized screening system to a more decentralized one. Our results imply that decentralized governance is more effective than the centralized one in public R&D investments.
The major challenge with estimations on public R&D programs is the identification issues that result from selection biases and omitted variables. We attempt to address these identification concerns by using two approaches, i.e., propensity score matching (PSM) and two-stage estimations with instrumental variables (IVs). We use the PSM approach to match Innofund-backed firms with nonInnofund-backed firms on the basis of various criteria that may predict the probability of a firm being selected by Innofund and the future innovation potentials of the firm.
Subsequently, we employ two-stage estimations with two IVs to further address endogeneity issues. The first IV refers to the total number of firms located in hightech zones in a given city for a given year. The second IV refers to the ratio of annual investments in fixed assets made by local governments over GDP at the county level for a given year. Both IVs reflect how ambitious the local governments are. We suggest that the more ambitious the local governments are, the more likely they support local firms to participate in Innofund program competition and also exert more effort to lobby the upper-level governments for local firms to win Innofund grants. Statistically, the two-stage estimations confirm the relevance and the exogeneity of the IVs, thereby indicating that the two IVs are qualified. Our major findings remain robust after the identification issues are addressed.
Our study differs from and complements the existing literature in three aspects. First, our study is the first one that links the governance of the government R&D programs and the effects of such programs. The Innofund program, which was initiated by the central government in 1999, underwent a significant change in its governance in 2005 when the central government decided to shift from a centralized project screening system into a relatively decentralized one. This exogenous policy change provides us with the opportunity to scrutinize the use of the quasi-experiment approach and determine how governance of public R&D programs influences the effects of such programs. Our study proves that the governance of government R&D programs is an important factor that contributes to the effects of such programs.
Second, this study is among the first examinations on the effects of government R&D programs in China. The Chinese government has been deeply involved in businesses, particularly in resource allocation. The inefficiencies that result from the involvement of the Chinese government in business are well documented (Brandt et al., 2013; Guo et al., 2014) . Thus, China serves as an interesting case to examine whether government R&D support is effective in an economy where "government failures" are rampant and the market remains immature. Third, we employ two approaches to address the identification concerns in this study. Most existing studies on government R&D programs mainly employ PSM approach to mitigate selection biases. In our study, we not only employ PSM but also apply two-stage estimations to control the potential concerns with missing variables. Hence, we attempt to shed some light on the existing discussions with regard to why empirical findings are inconclusive in terms of the effects of government R&D programs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the institutional background of the Innofund program and the policy changes it underwent in 2005. Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 presents the empirical findings on whether Innofund affects innovation outputs of firms and examines the robustness of the results. Section 5 reports the findings on the effects of the policy change of Innofund governance. Section 6 provides the conclusions. At the same time, as a nonprofit-making government policy, "it is oriented towards social welfare induced by positive effect of innovation." The principal criteria for applying to Innofund are as follows: The project should comply with national industrial technology policies, exhibit relatively high potential for economic and social benefits, and competitive in the market. The applicant should be a business corporation with generally not more than 500 employees, not less than 30% of which should have received higher education. The annual R&D investment of the firm should be at least more than 3% of the total sales, and the number of R&D employees should be more than 10% of the total number of employees. Firms with leading products in the market with an economy of scale production must also exhibit good economic performance. The following projects are prioritized: projects with advanced technology or independent intellectual property rights and high value added; projects established by researchers or overseas returnees to commercialize their scientific achievements; innovation projects jointly initiated by firms, universities, and research institutions; and projects that utilize new and advanced technologies to revive the stock assets of traditional industries and drive job creation.
Institutional Background of the Innofund Program

Introduction of Innofund Program
Innofund provides three forms of financing, namely, appropriation, interestfree bank loans, and equity investment. Appropriation is provided as start-up capital for small firms founded by a researcher with scientific achievements. Partial subsidies are also provided to SMEs for the development of new products and pilot production.
The total amount of subsidies for an individual project is generally between 1-2 million RMB. Firms are required to provide dollar-to-dollar matching investments in the funded projects. Interest-free loans are provided mainly to SMEs that require external financing from commercial banks to expand the production of innovative projects. Generally, equity investment is reserved for projects that use advanced 
Data and Sample
Variables and Data Sources
We are interested in the changes in innovation outputs, particularly on commercialized and technological innovation outputs of the firms after they receive support from Innofund. Commercialized innovation outputs are measured by annual sales from new products and exports of a firm, whereas technological innovation outputs are measured by the number of newly granted patents of a firm for each year.
We also control several firm-specific variables including age, size, leverage ratio, and ownership structure of firms (detailed definitions of the variables can be found in Table A 
Data Matching
The first challenge in this study is data matching because the names of the firms listed in the three databases may not be fully consistent. First, we need to match the list of Innofund-backed firms in the Innofund website with the list in the ASIFP database to identify which firms in the ASIFP database have won Innofund support and obtain detailed financial information for these firms. We employ both computerized matching and manual matching approaches to match the two databases.
As mentioned, both the Innofund website and ASIFP provide information for the names, locations (at city level), and industries of the firms by year. ASIFP also provides information for the legal person code of all the firms in the database. We use these information to conduct the matching.
First, we apply a three-stage matching strategy for the computerized matching, which is similar to that used by the NBER Patent Data Project 4 , to ensure accuracy of the matching. In the first step, we standardize the firm names in the two databases to prepare for the matching. Under the Company Law of China, a company name must contain four elements, namely, a trade name, industry sector, legal entity identifier (e.g., Limited Liability Company or Joint Stock Limited Liability Company), and the administrative region. We first create a "standard name" for a firm by removing the punctuations, spaces, or other special characters (e.g., !, @, #, $, %, ^, &, *, -, =, [, /, ], \, etc.) 5 and standardizing the legal entity identifiers (e.g., we converted Limited into Ltd.). This step is carried out to prevent the matching quality from being affected by inconsistencies in the formats of firm names listed in the two databases. Moreover, we created a "stem name" for each firm by removing the administrative region and legal entity identifiers in the firm name (e.g., a firm called "Beijing Tian Fa Logistics Ltd" is changed to "Tian Fa Logistics"). This step is carried out to prevent the matching quality from being affected by the mistake driven by input errors with legal entity identifiers or administrative regions of firms.
In the second stage, we identify Innofund-backed firms from ASIFP by conducting matching with "standard names", "stem names", and other information in the two databases by Innofund awarding year. We first accurately match the two databases using the "standard names", locations (at city level), and standard industry company has an exclusive right to its name on a regional basis. A company name must be unique and identical within its region. Thus, if a firm has exact the same Chinese name and location in the two databases for the same year, then it should be the same firm. We repeat this procedure for each Innofund awarding year and the counterpart year of ASIFP, and generate the matching files by year accordingly.
Next, we repeat the previously mentioned matching procedures by replacing the "standard names" with the "stem names" and generate a matched file called "partial matching" for each Innofund awarding year. We use "stem names" to conduct additional matching to determine potential missed cases during matching using "standard names" (we may not have exhausted all the expressions of the legal entity identifiers and converted them into standard identifiers when we created "standard names"). Finally, we combine the matching results of the "full matching"
and "partial matching" by year and delete duplicates using the legal person codes of each firm by year. After these matching procedures, we generate a cross-sectional dataset for each year between 1998 and 2007 in which Innofund-backed firms are identified in ASIFP for the year when they obtained the grant.
After the computerized matching, we conduct manual matching. We manually check all Innofund-backed manufacturing firms that are not matched by computerized matching using online search engines such as Google and Baidu. We mainly focus on checking the names, business nature, legal person codes, and Innofund granting records of the firms to ensure that we do not miss some observations because of slight variations of the trade names of firms listed in the two databases. Similarly, after the manual matching, we establish a cross-sectional dataset for each year in which
Innofund-backed firms that are missed in computerized matching are identified in ASIFP for the year they obtained the grant.
Finally, we merge all identified Innofund-backed firms into ASIFP. We first combine the yearly matching results from the computerized and manual matching by year and create a pooled cross-sectional dataset entitled "final matching" for each year in which all Innofund-backed firms are identified from ASIFP for the year they won the grant. We thereby obtain the legal person codes of all identified Innofund-backed firms and distinguish the time when the firm was awarded an Innofund grant. Finally, 2,638 firms that won backing from Innofund at least once between 1999 and 2007 are identified for the estimations. 6 We build the panel data for the identified firms by merging the firms listed in "final matching" into ASIFP by year and adding two dummy variables into ASIFP to distinguish whether the firm won and when it won
Innofund (Brandt et al., 2012) . The final sample consists of 18,224 firm-year observations for Innofund-backed firms.
With this matching strategy, we ensure that the variations or the changes of firm names over the years will not affect the quality of our matching. First of all, by controlling the "standard names", locations (at city level), industries of firms, and the year in computerized matching, we may ensure that type I error does not occur in matching. According to the Company Law of China, a company name must contain four elements, namely, a trade name, industry sector, legal entity identifier (e.g., Limited Liability Company or Joint Stock Limited Liability Company), and the 6 The number of Innofund-backed firms for the estimations dropped substantially from 11,977 (the number of project backed between 1999 and 2007) to 2,638 for estimations during the examination period because of several reasons. The ASIFP database covers manufacturing firms only; therefore, we cannot include non-manufacturing firms backed by Innofund, thus reducing the number of Innofund-backed firms in the sample. Non-state-owned firms with sales of less than RMB 5 million are also not included in the ASIFP. Hence, we may have missed several micro-sized firms backed by Innofund. One of the aims of the study is to estimate the ex-post effects of Innofund. An Innofund-backed firm that lacks information on the year when it received funding is also excluded. Theoretically, we included all state-owned manufacturing firms supported by Innofund and non-state-owned manufacturing firms with more than 5 million RMB in sales (in the year of application) backed by Innofund for the estimations.
administrative region. Moreover, a company has an exclusive right to its name on a regional basis. Thus, if the Chinese name, location, and industry of a company are shown exactly the same in both databases in the same year, then it must be identified as the same company. Year is an important factor to secure the accuracy of the matching. Firms are considered identical only when the firm names can be matched in the same year shown in both databases. Moreover, to prevent type II errors in matching, we apply computerized matching by replacing the "standard names" with "stem names" and manual matching. Such procedures prevent the matching quality from being affected by the variations in firm names shown in the two databases. This study also needs to match the firms in the ASIFP database with those in the SIPO patent database to identify patent information for all firms in the estimations.
In general, three types of patents exist in China, namely, invention, utility, and design patents. Invention patents are subject to examinations similar to those conducted in other major patent offices in the world. This type of patent is given 20 years of protection and may be granted to the methods and products. Both utility and design patents are given 10 years of protection. Utility patents are generally granted to technical solutions related to shapes or structures, whereas design patents are normally granted to shapes and patterns with patentable aesthetic appeal. Firms have to exert considerable effort to generate patentable materials, although invention patents are the most technologically innovative and thus require more R&D efforts than the two other types. In this study, we measure patent outputs using two values:
the number of invention patents and the number of patents of all types granted to a firm in a given year. Given that creating patentable works and applying for a patent take time, we use filing time of newly granted patents as a basis in panel estimations.
We also use the one-year lag of filing time for all estimations to check the robustness of the results.
The matching strategy we apply to match ASIFP and SIPO is significantly similar to that which is used to match the name lists of Innofund-backed firms and the ASIFP. However, the major difference is that SIPO does not provide information for the industry of a firm that we do not control in the matching. However, this issue will not affect the quality of our matching. As we discussed earlier, firm names, location and year are the details that are needed to secure the accuracy of the matching.
A potential concern with patent matching is the potential miscount of patents for the subsidiaries of firms. According to the Patent Law of China, organizational patent applicants must provide the registration license while applying to file a patent, thereby suggesting that a firm that applies for patents must be an independent legal entity. Patents applied by subsidiaries that are not registered as independent legal entities will be filed to the parent firm. Similarly, only an independent legal entity will be recognized as an individual firm. Therefore, our matching approach, which is based on both the names and locations of firm (for cross-sectional data matching by year) and legal person codes (for panel construction), should not be affected negatively by miscounts for firm subsidiaries.
Sampling: PSM
We estimate the effects of Innofund on firm innovation outputs by constructing a control group of non-Innofund-backed firms. We build the control group with several steps to ensure that our results are not driven by a specific matching method and control for selection biases. We first identify firms that are eligible to apply for Innofund but did not apply or did not win the grant from the ASIFP Database. The Innofund selection criteria are officially announced each year.
A firm is eligible for Innofund application if its SIC 7 is similar to the SICs of the awarded group, has fewer than 500 employees, and has a leverage ratio lower than 70%. The Innofund program also requires that R&D investments of a firm should be more than 3% of the total sales, and the number of R&D employees should be more than 10% of the total number of employees.
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After identifying all eligible firms, we utilize a PSM algorithm proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) to construct the control group on the basis of the identified pool of eligible firms. In the context of our study, the propensity score refers to the predicted probability of a firm to receive Innofund support. According to the screening criteria of Innofund program introduced in Section 2, firms with potential to generate high economic and social benefits, firms with leading products in the market, firms with projects that utilize new and advanced technologies or with independent intellectual property rights and high value added, and projects that utilize new and advanced technologies will be prioritized. That is, innovation potentials are the major consideration when Innofund selects projects to support. Therefore, innovation performance is our major focus in designing the PSM algorithm. When non-Innofund-backed firms are constructed on this propensity score, we ensure that the matched non-Innofund-backed firms are selected based on their two-digit SIC industry code, location, size, leverage ratio, sales from new products, exports, and stock of patents. Following the suggestion of Démurger et al. (2002), we control the location to capture disparities in regional growth rates and levels of development, which may affect the results. We also match the size and leverage ratio of Innofund-7 The National Bureau of Statistics in China updated the SIC system in 2003. Thus, we amend the two-digit SIC before 2003 to maintain consistency with the latest code system. backed firms and their counterparts. These criteria ensure that Innofund-backed and non-Innofund-backed firms are similar in many aspects, which may affect the probability of being supported by Innofund and their innovation outputs in the future.
Specifically, we use one-to-five nearest-neighbor PSM to identify non-Innofundbacked firms. We also impose common support restrictions during matching.
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Moreover, to assess matching quality, we check whether significant differences in relevant variables between Innofund-backed and matched non-Innofund-backed firms can be found by following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) . Table 2 presents the results of the balance tests of both the randomly drawn sample 10 and the PSM matched sample on major innovation measurements. T-statistics indicated that the relevant variables are balanced between the Innofund-backed firms and the PSM matched sample.
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The major shortcoming of the ASIFP database that affects our PSM is that Table 3 shows the summary statistics of Innofund-backed and non-Innofundbacked firms in the PSM control group, including the number of observations, mean, 9 Our results are robust after we remove the common support restrictions. 10 We construct a randomly draw sample of the control group and present the difference between the sample matched by PSM approach and the randomly draw sample to further justify why we have to employ the PSM sample in order to reduce the selection biases. 11 The balance tests for other variables are available upon request. maximum, and standard deviations across the entire examination period. On average, Innofund-backed firms have higher innovation outputs in terms of the number of newly granted patents and sales from new products. Similarly, these firms are younger and larger in size as measured by total sales and total assets. These firms also have lower liability compared with non-Innofund-backed firms. No considerable difference was observed in exports between the two groups.
Does Innofund Affect Innovation Outputs?
In our subsequent analysis, we examine whether the Innofund Program stimulates innovation outputs. First, we compare the innovation outputs of Innofundbacked firms with those of non-Innofund-backed firms. Second, we examine whether the amount of Innofund grant is associated with innovation outputs. Finally, we address the identification issues using two-stage regression models.
Innovation Outputs of Innofund-backed and Non-Innofund-backed Firms
We test whether the Innofund Program helps firms generate more innovation outputs by implementing fixed effect panel data regression through the following basic regression models:
where i indices a firm, indices time, and yit are dependent variables used to measure the innovation output of firm at time . (Petersen, 2009) . Table 4 presents the results on the effects of Innofund on innovation outputs of firms. Models (1) to (4) show that is significantly and positively associated with sales from new products and exports of firms, whether these values are measured by absolute figures or dummy variables. These findings suggest that Innofund-backed firms generate significantly higher sales from new products and exports after gaining government support compared with non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before funds were infused. Meanwhile, the probability that Innofund-backed firms generate sales from new products and exports is significantly higher than that of nonInnofund-backed firms and the same firms before the funds were infused. For example, Model (2) shows that, given the other things being equal, the probability that a firm generates sales from new products will increase by 7.88% after the firm wins Innofund support. Similarly, Model (4) shows that winning Innofund support can help to increase the probability that a firm generates export by 2.41%.
Models (5) and (6) (5) shows that the growth rate of newly granted patents of all types for Innofund-backed firms after the grant is 13.2% higher than that of non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before winning the grant. Model (6) shows that the growth rate of newly granted invention patents for Innofund-backed firms after the grant of funds is 8.6% higher than that of non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before the grant. In summary, Table 4 shows that Innofund effectively influences the innovation outputs of awarded firms. Our results remain the same when we use the one-year lag for patent filing time.
The monetary effect of the funding is also examined. The estimation focuses on the total amount of Innofund support given to firms. Thus, we may obtain more insightful ideas on the extent to which government R&D funding addresses the financial constraints of firms in China where resource allocation is biased. The amount of funding (InnoAmtit) is used to replace in Equations 1.1 and 1.2.
The results are presented in Table 5 . Models (1) to (4) show that InnoAmtit is significantly and positively correlated with the sales from new products and exports of firms. These findings imply that firms that win a larger Innofund grant may generate significantly higher sales from new products and exports. Meanwhile, the probability of generating sales from new products and exports increases as the size of Innofund support increases. For example, Model (2) shows that if a firm wins a funding of 1 million RMB, then the probability that the firm generates sales from new products increases by 11.73%. Similarly, Model (4) shows that if a firm wins a funding of 1 million RMB, the probability that the firm generates export increases by 2.63%.
Model (5) shows that after winning a funding of 1 million RMB, the growth of newly granted patents of all types generated by Innofund-backed firms is 20% higher than that of non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before the grant. Model (6) shows that a funding of 1 million RMB results in the 10% higher growth of newly granted invention patents generated by Innofund-backed firms compared with nonInnofund-backed firms and the same firms before the grant. The results shown in Table 5 imply that the amount of Innofund support affects the innovation outputs of firms significantly.
We further examine the effects of the relative weights of the funds. The ratio of Innofund support over total free cash of the firm is used to replace InnoAmtit, and the regressions conducted in Table 5 Table 4 are duplicated based on the newly matched subsample. The results are presented in Table A -2, which shows that our main conclusion remains the same after we control R&D input in the PSM process.
Identification
We have shown that Innofund-backed firms outperform non-Innofund-backed firms in terms of sales from new products, exports, and newly awarded patents after potential ex-ante selection effects are controlled using the PSM approach. One significant limitation of the PSM methodology is its inability to determine the effects of unobservable variables. Missing variables instead of Innofund may contribute to improved innovation outputs. For instance, we could not measure the R&D ability of firms or observe the management capability of executives on the basis of existing data.
However, both factors may contribute to the innovation outputs of the firms.
We use two-stage estimations to address the abovementioned identification concerns. A proper IV must be correlated to the endogenous variable but unrelated with unobserved variables that may affect dependent variables. The first IV used is the total number of firms in high-tech zones of the city where the firm is located in each given year (Frm_HTZ). High-tech zone is a distinctive type of special economic zone (SEZ) in China where central and local governments seek to attract foreign direct investment and consequently stimulate the development of the local economy.
Information on the number of firms in high-tech zones at city level is obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (1999-2007) . The second IV is the ratio of total investment in fixed assets made by local governments over the total GDP at the county level each year (Fxd_Asst). Information on local government investment across 1998 to 2007 is obtained from city yearbooks. Both IVs reflect the effort level of the local governments in the developing local economy. We suggest that these two IVs can help to identify the probability of a firm winning an Innofund grant. However, the IVs should not be directly correlated with the error terms that affect the innovation outputs of individual firms.
The choice of the two IVs is mainly based on the understanding in institutions in China. Under the regionally decentralized authoritarian regime in China, the central government governs the state through personnel control, whereas local governments manage economic activities and allocate resources (Xu, 2011) . During the economic reform era, local governors compete with each other in terms of economic growth, the search for resources, and support from the central government to obtain promotion opportunities. The success rate of local Innofund applications is one of the performance assessment criteria of local governments. Thus, more ambitious local governments are more likely to support local firms in competing for the Innofund program and to exert more effort in lobbying the upper-level governments for local firms to win Innofund grants. The level of effort of local governments in attracting foreign investment and investing in fixed assets is a good indicator to measure how ambitious the local governments are. We consequently expect the two IVs to be positively correlated to the probability a local firm winning Innofund.
However, the two IVs should not be directly correlated with the error terms of estimations on innovation outputs of individual firms. The two IVs used are measured either at the city level or county level, whereas innovation outputs are measured at the firm level. That is, we should not expect a direct relationship between the measurements of different levels unless externalities from high-tech zone development at city level or investment in fixed assets at county level exist. In particular, a potential argument is that innovative firms may tend to cluster geographically and consequently generate externalities to each other. However, empirical analysis on the spillover effects of high-tech zones or SEZs in China is limited, and results are mixed. Several studies find that the establishment and development of SEZs significantly and positively affects foreign direct investment, physical capital, exports, or outputs of foreign firms at the city or province level (Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Wang, 2013; Alder et al., 2013) . However, Hu (2007) did not obtain evidence of the geographical externalities of high-tech parks. Meanwhile, on the basis of firm-level data, Schminke and Van Biesebroeck (2013) reveal that firms within SEZs do not generate higher total factor productivity. The existing literature suggests that the relationship between the IVs we use and the innovation outputs of individual firms may be unclear. Thus, we statistically test the exogeneity of the IVs by conducting overidentification estimations (Sargan, 1958) .
Results of the two-stage estimations are reported in Table 6 . Panel A of Table   6 presents the results from the first stage of estimation. The results demonstrate that the number of firms in local high-tech zones and the investment in fixed assets made by local governments are significantly and positively correlated to whether a firm wins Innofund backing at a given year. These results suggest that a firm has a greater probability of receiving Innofund support when it is located in a city or county where local governments are more ambitious and provide more support to local firms. The first stage of estimations confirms the relevance of the instrumental variables.
The results of the second stage of estimation are presented in Panel B of Table   6 . Sargan tests are performed to test the exogeneity of the two IVs. The results of the Sargan tests indicate that the null hypothesis, which states that the two instrumental variables are uncorrelated to the residuals, cannot be rejected for all estimations.
Thus, the results statistically prove that both the IVs satisfy the conditions of qualifications as IVs. Models (1) to (2) 
Innofund Governance and Innofund Effects
The Moreover, information gathering, transmission, and processing are costly. Sah and Stiglitz (1991) argue that centralized organizations may delay decision making and reduce the total number of projects because of cost constraints and the lack of local information unlike decentralized screening systems. Following the information approach, Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Hart and Moore (2005) further emphasize that a decentralized decision making system may strengthen the incentives of local agents in acquiring information and may reduce the overload problem experienced by the principal. Stein (2002) predicts that decentralized organizations are more attractive when the needed information is "softer" (i.e., the information is difficult for outsiders to verify), whereas centralized organizations are more favorable when the needed information can be "hardened" (i.e., the information is easier to verify) without cost.
Another strand of research on the organization of decision making is mainly derived from soft budget constraints theory. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) suggest that a centralized credit market may affect efficiency because of adverse selection and the lack of a termination mechanism. Qian and Xu (1998) (Dewatripont and Maskin 1995; Qian and Xu, 1998; Ahgion and Tirole, 1997; Hart and Moore, 2005) The abovementioned two institutional changes may be relevant to the enhanced Innofund effects observed after 2005. However, these institutional elements should have effects on Innofund-backed and non-Innofund-backed firms at the same time, although the marginal effects may be different for the two types of firms.
Nevertheless, in our panel estimations, we observe the before-and-after changes and the differences between Innofund-backed firms and non-Innofund-backed firms in terms of innovation outputs while using 2005 as a cut-off. Moreover, as shown in the data, the rejection rate of Innofund application significantly decreased after 2005, thus suggesting that the local IAC becomes more careful in project selection when it has more decision-making power in project screening and needs to commit the matching funds upfront. Therefore, we suggest that the change of governance of Innofund is a more direct factor contributing to the enhanced Innofund effects after 2005. The results are consistent with the arguments of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) , Ahgion and Tirole (1997), and Qian and Xu (1998) . These researchers propose a more decentralized screening system for investing in R&D-oriented projects when the degree of uncertainty is higher and the information issues are more severe.
Conclusion
This paper estimates the effects of Innofund on the innovation outputs of firms.
Innofund is one of the largest Chinese government programs that target corporate R&D activities of SMEs in China. We examine how the governance of such a program influences the effects of Innofund aside from its general effects on the innovation outputs of firms.
Innofund-backed firms generate significantly more innovation outputs compared with non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before Innofund funding was infused. We use PSM methodology to control the selection issues. The results remain robust after using two-stage Heckman estimations to further address the identification problems. These findings are consistent with several existing studies, which argue that government funding stimulates corporate R&D activities (Irwin and Klenow 1996; Griliches and Regev, 1998; Audretsch et al., 2002; Lach, 2002; Görg and Strobl, 2007 Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) , Ahgion and Tirole (1997) , and Qian and Xu (1998) .
This study provides a new perspective for evaluating government R&D policy.
We extend the existing studies on government R&D programs by looking further at the governance of the government R&D programs and their influence on the effects of such programs that have been largely neglected by extant literature. Meanwhile, as a first systematic examination of government-supported corporate R&D programs in China, this study extends the extant literature by exploring how the market failures and the government engagements interact under weak institutions in China. Finally, this study is also related to the literature on general R&D financing mechanisms by exploring the governance of the financial institutions and the effects of the investment.
This study has important policy implications. The findings of this study suggest that decentralized governance may ease the information issues and motivate local governments to exert more effort in project selection and ex-post monitoring activities, thus improving the effects of government R&D programs. Moreover, the Chinese government has continually emphasized the role of innovation in fostering a sustainable economy and allocated public funds at an accelerating rate to support R&D activities. Driven by government policy, China's R&D expenditure has grown into the second largest worldwide since 2010 (WSJ, 2010) and is expected to become the largest worldwide by 2022 (KPMG, 2013). China's current R&D expenditure over GDP ratio is higher than that of the European Union (Noorden, 2014) , and its total number of patent applications has surpassed that of the U.S. since 2011 (KPMG, 2013) . 14 Public support for industrial innovation in China is a major topic in international political economy because it determines the sustainability of China's growth and affects the competitive landscape of the global economy. However, solid empirical analysis on the consequences of public support has yet to be conducted.
This assessment of Innofund program and its governance should have some important policy implication on how we view the innovation capacity in China.
This study also raises several questions for further research. First, if government R&D programs indeed contribute to the innovation outputs of the firms, are innovation outputs simultaneously transferred to improvements in the productivity or profitability of the firms? Second, can other mechanisms (e.g., property right institutions, IPR protection, financial budget constraints [Qian and Xu, 1998; Huang and Xu, 1999] , product competition, and input markets or trust and relationships [Allen, et al., 2012] 
